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The 1930's opened with 
an omen of the pressures that 
would intensify attempts to 
form an effective antiwar coa-
lition and at the same time 
would wedge irreconcilable 
differences of view between 
the factions of the peace 
movement. Japanese troops 
drove into Manchuria in Sep-
tember, 1931, and Toyohiko 
Kagawa wrote: 
Again I have become a child 
of an aching heart, 
Carrying the burden of Ja-
pan's crime, 
Begging the pardon of China 
and of the world, 
With a shattered soul; 
I have become a child of sad-
ness.1 
The American State Depart-
ment countered the Japanese 
attack on China with the 
Stimson Doctrine that it would not recognize any settlement that im-
paired the territorial or political sovereignty of China. The League of 
Nations vacillated, formed a commission to investigate, and finally con-
demned Japan, while trying to leave the way open for a negotiated peace 
in the Far East. About eighteen months after her attack, Japan withdrew 
from the League. 
This crusade is being launched because 
of the serious possibility that within the near 
future a general war will break out in 
Europe and Asia. The signs of the times are 
more disquieting than during the years pre-
ceding the outbreak of the World War. 
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In such a world governments have little 
confidence in treaties and are sceptical con-
cerning the effectiveness of pacific agencies 
of justice. As an instrument of war preven-
tion, the League of Nations is weak. And 
this fact constitutes one of the most ominous 
aspects of the present world situation. Inter-
national anarchy produces war. 
The peace sentiment of the nation must 
be adequately organized if peace legislation 
is to be adhered to during the hysteria of 
crisis. Mass pressure from citizens is required 
both for the enactment and maintenance of 
a pacific foreign policy. 
No-Foreign-War Crusade (1937) 
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The Manchurian crisis pre-empted the attention of the American 
peace movement, which had focused on fairly remote considerations of 
world organization, international law and moral regeneration. Even the 
program of arms reduction by international agreement, a political ob-
jective upon which the movement was united, was disrupted by the crisis. 
In April, 1932, leaders of major peace groups formed an Interorgani-
zation Council on Disarmament (ICD) in order to coordinate activities 
designed to promote the success of the international disarmament confer-
ence in Geneva.2 The member groups fell into at least two broad wings. 
One consisted of traditional internationalists who, whether committed to 
international law or organization, were oriented to informational pro-
grams. They sought to educate the public; and, because their leaders 
were influential men, they also hoped to influence policy-makers in-
formally. These were groups such as the Carnegie Endowment for Inter-
national Peace and the World Peace Foundation, which antedated World 
War I, or the League of Nations Association and the Foreign Policy 
Association, which had their origins in the Great Crusade.3 
The other wing of the ICD consisted of groups whose leadership was 
largely, if not exclusively, pacifist—men and women who not only worked 
for peace but repudiated any given war. They, too, sought to inform the 
public on international affairs, but there were differences. For one thing, 
throughout the Twenties they had cultivated a moral opposition to war 
itself. For another, they were issue-oriented and had in fact considerable 
staff experience in organizing various segments of public opinion. The 
liberal pacifist groups were without exception formed during or immedi-
ately after World War I, and they combined a traditional pacifist repudi-
ation of war per se with a progressive emphasis on social-political reform 
and transnational humanism. They included the Fellowship of Recon-
ciliation, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom and 
the National Council for Prevention of War.4 
Ironically, in view of their later alignment against collective security, 
liberal pacifists were most militant in response to the Manchurian in-
cursion. Not all pacifists agreed, but the major pacifist groups supported 
collective sanctions against Japan, and they were a driving force within 
the ICD for collaboration with the League. James G. McDonald, chair-
man of the Foreign Policy Association and the ICD, was "shocked and 
horrified by the willingness of so-called radicals and pacifists to jump into 
the use of sanctions almost without thinking."5 Nonetheless, the ICD 
itself was converted temporarily from a conference site into a pressure 
group, as an aroused peace movement tried to pull together in response 
to the Far Eastern crisis. 
Unanimity did not last. The council divided over what programs it 
should urge upon policy-makers the following winter and spring. By 
autumn, 1932, the council had returned to its original design as an organi-
zation for educating and conferring. Six months later it dissolved, thus 
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ending a major attempt to coordinate the whole peace movement and 
paving the way for fresh coalitions. 
The fleeting Interorganization Council for Disarmament contributed 
little to antiwar work and could be dismissed outright, except that it 
conveniently illustrates the pressures that determined the configuration 
of the peace movement in the Thirties. 
At that time the cause of peace required a political response to the 
threat of real war and totalitarianism. Peace advocates of almost all per-
suasions accepted the validity of political activity—influencing decision-
makers through personal contact or public groups—and political action 
required coalitions of peace societies to build and sustain antiwar public 
pressure. The consequence was a politically articulate, aggressive antiwar 
movement, aligning and realigning in search of bases for effective coali-
tion. That was one axis (as it were) of antiwar strategy in the Thirties, 
and it represented continuity with coalition efforts in the previous decade. 
The impact of war and totalitarianism also heightened latent differ-
ences of approach within the peace movement. These differences under-
lay and disrupted coalition efforts on behalf of arms limitation, neutrality 
legislation, an international conference for economic redistribution and 
neutral mediation. The ICD floundered in 1932 because the campaign 
for arms limitation had largely failed. (The Geneva conference accom-
plished nothing. It adjourned in July, 1932, resumed discussion from the 
following February to July, adjourned again and lingered on from 
October, 1933, until spring.) Disarmament, like defense, always had been 
an instrument of national policy; and in the Thirties peace advocates 
divided and realigned over basic, prior policy questions. The conse-
quences were that traditional internationalists became increasingly polit-
ical in their support of collective security, and that those liberal pacifists 
who in the Twenties had related to every internationalist approach be-
came isolated from the broad peace movement in their pursuit of neu-
trality. That was the other axis of antiwar strategy in the Thirties—an 
ever sharper cleavage between pacifists and traditional internationalists— 
and this represented discontinuity from the Twenties. 
Following the Manchurian crisis some traditional internationalists 
tried to develop an energetic program. Their efforts were given a fresh 
impetus when on January 29, 1935, the Senate failed to carry adherence 
to the World Court. Raymond Rich, general secretary of the World 
Peace Foundation, complained, "The peace forces, having for the most 
part disregarded the popular, are losing the populace."6 After a series of 
meetings, leaders in the League of Nations Association devised a political 
program and an organizational base which largely reflected the thinking 
of James T. Shotwell and Newton D. Baker. Their political program 
coupled issues then quite popular—control of arms traffic, war profits and 
disarmament—with the traditionalist objectives of world economic co-
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operation and close American association with the League. Their organi-
zational base envisioned a new coalition with the politically experienced 
pacifist wing, which itself was drafting a coordinated program through 
the fledgling National Peace Conference. Shotwell wanted the pacifists, 
their organizational apparatus and their constituency, but not their dis-
tinctive programs. He believed that it would be possible to give "recog-
nition" to the National Peace Conference "while subordinating it to the 
broader plan" of traditional internationalists by naming the leadership 
and providing the funds.7 
Quite to the contrary, when the new coalition was organized, late in 
1935, it was coop ted by the liberal pacifists. There were at least three 
reasons for this. First, Shotwell and Baker were unable to get the fifty 
thousand dollars they had budgeted, whereas the pacifists were able to 
raise that much or more on their own.8 Second, although the traditional-
ists were able to name the chairman, Walter Van Kirk, the pacifists won 
numerical balance on the steering committee and, with their prior in-
volvement in politics, they obtained considerable initiative there.9 Third, 
the liberal pacifists already had designed a "broader plan" of their own 
to which the National Peace Conference itself was subordinated—a half 
million dollar Emergency Peace Campaign "to keep the United States 
from going to war," to promote such political and economic changes as 
"are essential to a just and peaceable world order," and to enlist pacifist 
organizations and individuals in this common cause.10 The Peace Cam-
paign was fashioned and operated largely by leaders in the American 
Friends Service Committee and the Fellowship of Reconciliation. 
FOR leaders especially looked to the political center for an antiwar 
coalition as the pressures of war and totalitarianism mounted. They 
found no effective base on the Left, with which they had frequently 
associated in the cause of social justice. Some of them had been attracted 
to the united front American League Against War and Fascism, organized 
in September, 1933, in response to a similar coalition in Europe. Other 
pacifists opposed cooperation with Communists in any case, and even 
those who initially were sympathetic soon were repelled when Commu-
nists coopted the League and manipulated it for their own purposes. The 
Socialist Party was riddled with factionalism in the mid-Thirties, and 
soon was placed in an awkward position on foreign affairs by the Spanish 
Civil War; Norman Thomas lobbied for strict neutrality legislation at 
the same time that he tried to defend his Party's legal right to intervene 
in the Spanish Civil War through the "Debs Column" of socialist volun-
teers.11 The Emergency Peace Campaign was aimed, therefore, at the 
political center. 
It purported to represent a broad coalition of pacifists and non-paci-
fist civic groups, but actual decision-making was in the hands of a nucleus 
of pacifists who wielded large financial and staff resources. Special depart-
ments were set up to reach youth, labor, church and civic groups re-
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spectively. A coordinated lobby swung into action in Washington. News 
releases and pamphlet literature flowed from a publicity department. 
Well known speakers (including Admiral Richard Byrd) were shuttled 
around the country. The campaign proceeded in a series of programs 
designed to stress the international crisis, to develop a "No-Foreign-War-
Crusade" and to popularize world economic cooperation. Public events 
were numbered by the thousand; literature was distributed by the hun-
dreds of thousand. The liberal pacifist leaders were able to focus public 
attention on specific issues, particularly neutrality; and traditional inter-
nationalists became increasingly restive in the coalition, which they 
feared was building isolationist sentiment.12 
Their cooperation was based on the fact that there were many areas 
on which the peace movement agreed, that the pressure of a deteriorating 
international scene was clear, and that their own foreign policy programs 
were not yet clear. Under the varied rhetoric and diverse programs of 
the Emergency Peace Campaign there was a dual emphasis: neutrality 
and world economic cooperation. During the course of the campaign the 
alternative premises underlying both neutrality and international eco-
nomic reconstruction became increasingly clear and divisive. 
Pacifist leaders clarified their views on neutrality earlier than did 
traditional internationalists or the Administration. Early in the decade 
they lost hope in the League of Nations as an agency of either maintain-
ing international order or negotiating changes in it; and as they watched 
the rise of totalitarian states they became convinced that peaceful change 
was necessary in order to maintain order.13 Their neutralism was thus 
grounded in their perceptions of events in Europe, although it was popu-
larized by a moralistic rhetoric that obscured the analysis of a small 
coterie of leading pacifists—notably Socialist leader Norman Thomas, 
Socialist author and journalist Devere Allen, influential speaker and 
author Kirby Page, and Socialist Scott Nearing. Frederick Libby, of the 
National Council for Prevention of War; Dorothy Detzer, the lobbyist and 
political organizer for the Women's International League for Peace and 
Freedom; John Nevin Sayre and Harold Fey of the Fellowship of Recon-
ciliation; A. J. Muste, FOR leader and an early radical organizer; and 
C. C. Morrison, editor of the Christian Century also were influential as 
was Reinhold Niebuhr until the mid-Thirties.14 
Briefly, then, according to pacifist political theory, Germany, Italy and 
Japan faced serious internal weaknesses, and the means by which their 
rulers dealt with their problems increased the danger of war. Authority 
there rested superficially on military power, but actually it was based on 
an insecure and temporary acquiescence of the people. In order to secure 
control, therefore, dictators not only developed extraordinary economic 
measures, but also identified themselves with militant nationalistic creeds 
which they fashioned into elements of state cohesion and party loyalty.15 
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Moreover, these inherently belligerent states were the have-not nations of 
the industrial world. 
The western democracies had divided up the markets, resources and 
underdeveloped territories of the world, explained Kirby Page. These 
nations had won and maintained their holdings through economic im-
perialism and military might. Then they had piously agreed that im-
perialist acquisition should be brought to an end. The most-favored 
nations thus perpetuated the status quo which benefitted them and which 
they alone could change peaceably.16 
Their analysis of the threat to world peace apparently posed by both 
the internal instability and the international disadvantage of totalitarian 
states led some pacifists to react to fascist aggression in terms of two 
principles: to strengthen democracy in nonfascist countries (such as 
Spain), and to alleviate the differences between have and have-not nations 
through peaceful means. They shared this analysis and these goals with 
many non-pacifists, including especially Socialists. 
At this point they concluded that the crux of the peace problem was 
not totalitarianism per se but, rather, the inflexibility of political and 
economic arrangements. They differed from traditional internationalists 
principally in their belief that collective security as interpreted by the 
great European powers in their own economic and territorial interests 
contributed to the very rigidity in international affairs that made war 
likely. Pacifists who had advocated collective sanctions against Japan 
quickly lost hope in the League and abandoned collective security. Years 
later, when Nazi warplanes multiplied Shanghai's horror in Warsaw, 
Charles Clayton Morrison recalled that the principle had broken down 
in Manchuria. In the absence of a working international system, he said, 
a discriminatory embargo was clearly an alliance for war.17 The great 
powers would act only in their own interests to freeze the status quo. The 
League was an international instrument, but not an agency of inter-
nationalism. Pacifist leaders interpreted neutrality as a strategy for a 
flexible foreign policy which might be used in order to strengthen inter-
nationalism. 
Neither the State Department nor the traditional internationalists 
had formulated a firm neutrality policy by 1935. The situation was ripe 
for aggressive congressional initiative at just the time that pacifist-led 
groups became virtually unanimous in pressing for neutrality legislation 
that would be impartial and apply to all belligerents, and mandatory in 
regard to the President. They operated through the National Council for 
Prevention of War, the Women's International League for Peace and 
Freedom and the isolationist bloc in the Senate. They were instrumen-
tal in securing the Neutrality Act of 1935 which abandoned the tradi-
tional neutral rights to trade and required an impartial embargo of all 
belligerents, which was extended with few changes to May 1, 1937.1S 
Accordingly, when the traditional internationalists joined pacifists 
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in a political coalition in 1935-1936, they joined a movement already 
geared for impartial neutrality designed to keep America out of war. 
This did not seem to be a serious obstacle at the time. 
The traditionalists had expected to dominate the coalition, of course. 
But, in any case, they still regarded collective security as consonant with 
a neutral embargo. That was the minimal commitment to collectivism 
that Norman Davis had pledged at the Geneva Disarmament Conference 
in 1933: the United States would promise not to obstruct collective 
sanctions applied against an aggressor state. This "negative declaration" 
seems to have been assumed adequate in 1935-1936 by the leaders of the 
League of Nations Association, although it was thrown into serious 
question in the Ethiopian crisis. An American embargo on all belligerents 
would act unilaterally but in concert with any international embargo 
applied to an aggressor. It would be the best of all possible worlds. 
Not the impartiality of the embargo, but rather the question of 
whether it should be mandatory upon the President seems to have pre-
cipitated the split in peace forces. In negotiating the Neutrality Acts of 
1935, 1936 and 1937 the Administration had jealously guarded its dis-
cretionary ability to determine when a state of war might exist and 
when, therefore, an embargo should be applied. Anything less permissive 
than that would jeopardize the power of the Executive to conduct the 
foreign relations of the United States, in the view of the State Depart-
ment. Pacifists were not satisfied with the way the Administration ex-
ercised its discretion, however; they pressed for the invocation of an im-
partial embargo in the China war, in Ethiopia and—with Socialists—in 
the Spanish Civil War.19 When, in the fall of 1937, they received the 
impression from Roosevelt's "Quarantine Speech" that the President 
might pursue a policy of applying sanctions selectively in alliance with 
other great powers, they resumed their attack upon his discretionary 
powers in foreign policy. They campaigned actively for the Ludlow 
constitutional amendment requiring a national referendum on involve-
ment in any foreign war; and consideration of it was narrowly defeated 
in the House on January 10, 1938.20 
The Ludlow Amendment campaign precipitated the political or-
ganization of traditional internationalists and helped them to define the 
neutrality issue. Convinced that so-called impartial neutrality legisla-
tion was operating to isolate American policy and that the neutrality 
campaigns were generating isolationism, Clark Eichelberger and his 
League of Nations Association staff began to mobilize traditional inter-
nationalists on behalf of discretionary embargoes against aggressor states. 
In effect, they began to promote actively that very concept of collective 
security which the pacifists had feared. They solicited support for a 
"Statement on Behalf of Concerted Peace Efforts" and opposition to the 
Ludlow Amendment. The significance of their efforts was not lost on 
James T. Shotwell, who himself had tried to create a peace coalition 
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without securing adequate political leverage within it. "Good general-
ship in the strategy of the peace movement," he now said, was represented 
by the aggressive director of the League of Nations Association [Eichel-
berger] who, with his staff, would organize a series of committees to make 
successive assaults on American neutrality.21 The controversy generated 
alternative organizations for political influence within the peace coali-
tion and the public. 
Meanwhile, the liberal pacifists and traditional internationalists were 
still working together in the Emergency Campaign, now promoting 
world economic cooperation. This was not a new idea. It had been 
sponsored by League of Nations bodies since at least 1922; and in the 
winter of 1936 George Lansbury, leader of the British Labour Party, had 
sought in vain to secure a resolution committing England to call a world 
conference to negotiate equilization of the resources of discontented 
nations.22 Lansbury was the featured speaker opening the Emergency 
Peace Campaign program in April, and he not only dwelt on an inter-
national conference in his speeches, but also discussed it with President 
Roosevelt before leaving the country. The President was cautious, saying 
he would need some solid "peg" upon which to hang a meeting of such 
magnitude.23 
Lansbury got his peg with the help of the International Fellowship 
of Reconciliation, with headquarters in England, which created an 
Embassies of Reconciliation in order to take the cause of peace directly 
to national leaders. Private citizens were designated as informal am-
bassadors in order to confer with government officials and establish some 
basis for negotiating peace before fighting should break out. Lansbury 
was the first citizen-ambassador appointed. In the spring of 1937 he 
conferred with the prime ministers of France, Belgium, Denmark, Nor-
way and Sweden, and with Hitler in Berlin. Subsequently he interviewed 
Mussolini and traveled with other representatives of the private group to 
the capitals of Southeastern Europe, and to Prague, Warsaw and Vienna. 
The most important conversation was, of course, that with Hitler who 
assured Lansbury that Germany would cooperate in a united effort if 
Roosevelt would take the lead in calling an economic conference.24 
Peace leaders of all political persuasions were emploring Roosevelt to 
take the lead, and their project got unimpeachable support in January, 
1938, from an exhaustive report on international economic conditions by 
a former Belgian prime minister, Paul Van Zeeland (with whom Lans-
bury had met). Van Zeeland urged the great powers to collaborate on 
specific items which would "impart to the world the impetus which it is 
awaiting in order to recover confidence in the pacific destiny of nations."25 
Roosevelt was already, and unhappily, familiar with the idea of a 
world conference, for the British had spurned the notion when it was 
broached early in 1938.26 Preliminary negotiations had been initiated 
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in January for a comprehensive peace conference emphasizing economic 
problems and treaty revision, but the plan was rejected by Neville Cham-
berlain. The President had realized then that a conference to redress 
international grievances was not a realistic alternative to European war 
because such a conference could not be convened. Peace advocates 
learned this after September, 1939; but even in the process of promoting 
an economic conference they had divided over its meaning. 
The Emergency Peace Campaign convened its own Conference on 
World Economic Cooperation at the end of March, and the traditional 
internationalists were dominant. Their experts supported Cordell Hull's 
reciprocal-trade-agreements program and also some aspects of the Van 
Zeeland report, but they argued, too, that any revisions of the Neutrality 
Law should be made flexible enough to distinguish between aggressors 
and victims.27 Their report fixed the division among internationalists 
between those who supported a strategy of collective action to contain 
aggression on the grounds that political order was a prerequisite for 
economic cooperation, and those pacifists who opposed the further align-
ment of the world into armed ideological camps on the grounds that 
basic economic change was a prerequisite for international order. 
The project for a world economic conference, like those for disarma-
ment, neutrality and the Emergency Peace Campaign itself, yielded divi-
sion. There was no alternative to separation. About a week after the 
disruptive conference on economic affairs, Eichelberger resigned as direc-
tor of the Campaign for World Economic Cooperation, organizing instead 
what Shotwell called a series of assaults on neutrality. During the next 
three years, under the pressure of fascist war abroad, his search for a 
coalition in support of collective sanctions against aggressors aligned him 
and his committees with those who urged outright intervention on behalf 
of the democracies. 
That is to say, the pressure of war and totalitarianism still operated 
to engender political coalitions even as it divided the internationalists. 
Pacifists felt this pressure acutely after the defeat of the Ludlow 
Amendment and the debacle of world economic cooperation. By the 
spring of 1938 they had formed a coalition with Socialists under the 
leadership of Norman Thomas, the Keep America Out of War Congress. 
Thoroughly alarmed by the organization of collective security advocates, 
pacifists cemented their alliance with Thomas early in February and 
launched it with a public meeting in New York on March 6.28 This was 
still the only national antiwar coalition opposed to collective security 
when the German troops rolled out across the low countries two years 
later. There were serious weaknesses in it. Pacifist organizations, par-
ticularly the Fellowship of Reconciliation and the Friends Service Com-
mittee, were shifting their resources away from political lines in order 
to provide for their relief work and their religious and conscientious 
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objector constituencies in the event of war. The Socialist Party was 
divided over foreign policy, among other issues, and Communists still 
exerted a disruptive and unpredictable influence. Moreover, the initial 
void on the political right was quickly filled by the America First Com-
mittee, organized in the summer of 1940 in reaction to Eichelberger's 
efforts for collective security. 
By January, 1941, the America First Committee was obtaining public 
and financial support that the Keep America Out of War Congress could 
not tap. Reluctantly, the antiwar left associated with America First in an 
effort to build antiwar public pressure, but in doing so it associated with 
the fortress America concept. The conservative and isolationist drift of 
the coalition resulted in the loss of most pacifist support by the spring 
of 1941. Increasingly, it was dominated by antiwar Socialists. By fall the 
Keep America Out of War Congress was a bankrupt, paper organization.29 
World War II seemed to hit the American people with the suddenness 
of the waves of planes that unleashed destruction over Pearl Harbor. But 
it came as something of an anticlimax in the travail of those who had 
advocated a strategy of neutrality in the cause of peace, because they al-
ready had suffered defeat in their essential political goals. The President 
had extended American military and economic goods to the Allies, had 
accepted naval commitments in the Atlantic and had revised neutrality 
legislation. Whether or not the country would have taken additional 
steps into the European war had it not been attacked in the Pacific, the 
President had sufficient executive power to conduct limited intervention. 
That, and not the war itself, was the essential political defeat for the 
neutralists. 
For those neutralists who also were internationalists there was a more 
profound, subtler defeat. Faced with the impact of real war and totali-
tarianism, they had organized brilliantly for political effectiveness. They 
had formed a strong coalition with traditional internationalists whose 
commitment to peace through international organization and justice they 
shared. Conceiving of neutralism as a flexible instrument for inter-
nationalism and viewing collective security as a way of making lines of 
national conflict more rigid, a few pacifists had bent every effort to com-
mit the public to strict and adamant neutrality. They had tried to press 
even the peace coalition into this service, and they had seen it break apart. 
Equally serious, tactically, was their inability to maintain an inde-
pendent, transnational and political organizational base once the coalition 
of the Center had been shattered. Besides, to a great extent they elevated 
specific political objectives above their own perceptions of international 
affairs, and they stressed the moral imperative of keeping out of war over 
their own political analysis of international conflict. Consequently, neu-
tralism was unalterably—if not, indeed, logically—associated only with 
isolationism. The very pressures of war and totalitarianism that had led 
to the formation of a great coalition symbolized by the Emergency Peace 
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Campaign had heightened the differences of outlook that broke it; and 
they ultimately weakened the force of the international vision claimed by 
those opposed to the strategy of collective security. 
There was neither an ideological nor an organizational base for a 
broadly progressive antiwar coalition just prior to World War II or dur-
ing it (as there had been in World War I). Internationalism was identi-
fied with collective security and then with wartime alliance. Neutralism 
was identified with isolationism. A premise of Cold War analysis—that 
international, liberal values are best served by being unconditionally 
committed to one side in a polarized world—was laid late in the Thirties. 
Or, rather, alternative world views were deprived then of a significant 
organizational base, at least until the nation would become the child of 
an aching heart, carrying the burden of crime, begging the pardon of Viet 
Nam and of the world: 
"With a shattered soul; 
I have become a child of sadness." 
Wittenberg University 
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